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Introduction – The Case of the Industrial City:

Northeast Minneapolis in the winter time is as bleak a scene as any that Dickens ever
penned. Standing on the street there, in the cold and the gray half-light, one sees boarded up
warehouses and gutted buildings. Above, a dim sodium lamp burns yellow, not so much
illuminating the street as differentiating between dark shadows and darker shadows. In the
distance is the smokestack of a smelter, billowing out a toxic black. The snow falls like ash and
one wonders how and why the city wound up in this grim state. This is a city of the 20th century
with which the 21st does not know what to do.
Hyperbole aside, I began with a Dickensian introduction because industry is so often
negatively connoted. Common descriptors associated with industry are ‘polluting’, ‘blighting’,
‘toxic’, and ‘hazardous’. Industrial disasters - tragedies around the world from Love Canal to
Bhopal - have rightly caught public attention. No one ever wants an industrial disaster to occur
in the place they call home, but assessing and preventing that risk is neither simple nor
straightforward. For one group, preventing disaster might seem like inviting it from the
perspective of another group. Conflicts arise, therefore, in the building of cities that pit the
ideologies and arguments of these groups against one another. This paper examines the case of
one such conflict in Northeast Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota and establishes a motive
and a mode for the actions of each group. This is the case of the Household Hazardous Waste
Facility. To understand the case though, it is first necessary to understand the background of the
case.
Land use in Northeast Minneapolis is characterized by dense industrial development in
close proximity to residential properties. Northeast Minneapolis contains the majority of
industrial land usage in the city of Minneapolis, and as the rest of the city has experienced
2
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deindustrialization and the relocation of industries towards the periphery of the metropolitan area,
the concentration of industrial land use in Northeast Minneapolis relative to the rest of the city
has become more acute. (Truax, 2009) Compounding this acuteness is the obligation of the city
to provide certain basic services, such as waste management, that must be fulfilled at a municipal
level and cannot be redistributed outside of the city. Consequently, the available places where
such activities can be located diminish due to rezoning, and Northeast Minneapolis has become
the most prominent site for this intra-urban redistribution of industry. The maps on the following
pages illustrate this geographic trend. Map 1 illustrates the distribution of industrial properties in
the city of Minneapolis; Map 2 focuses in on the industrial properties of Northeast Minneapolis
in particular; Map 3 illustrates the proximity of residents throughout Minneapolis to industrial
property; and Map 4 highlights the close proximity of Northeast Minneapolis residents to
industrial land use. These last two maps in particularly demonstrate the geographical disparity of
industrial distribution, and how Northeast Minneapolis residents live in relative proximity to
industrial land use compared to residents elsewhere in the city. Residents in Northeast
Minneapolis have begun to notice a growing, intangible sense that their livelihoods are being
impacted by industrialization more so than residents in other parts of the city. Trepidatious,
residents have begun to oppose efforts of further industrialization, beginning with their objection
against the household hazardous waste facility – the subject of this case study. (WPCIA, 2009)
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Map 1 – Industrial Properties in Minneapolis, Minnesota
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Map 2 – Industrial Properties in Northeast Minneapolis
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Map 3 – Proximity of Minneapolis residents to Industrial land use
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Map 4 – Proximity of Northeast Minneapolis residents to Industrial land use
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This paper focuses on the particular case of a household hazardous waste disposal and
transfer facility1 that was planned to be built in Northeast Minneapolis between 2004 and 2009.
The HHW facility was put forward by the city of Minneapolis and Hennepin County as a means
of providing residents greater geographic accessibility for HHW disposal. Household hazardous
waste includes any sort of hazardous waste normally found in a home, such as house paint, lawn
chemicals, plumbing chemicals, and the like. It cannot be disposed of with non-hazardous
household waste, except during special neighborhood pick-up events. Beyond these events,
HHW must be disposed of by residents at specific facilities, such as the one planned by the city.
(City of Minneapolis, 2004a)
The specific motivations and processes the city undertook are analyzed later in this paper,
but the city proposed the facility to mitigate risk to the exchange value of the land in Northeast
Minneapolis. Residents, on the other hand, reacted to the proposal in opposition. An HHW
facility, zoned by the city in the most intensive industrial land use category, would have
negatively impacted the use value of their land2. In the end, the plan was mothballed following a
decision by the site owner not to sell the property to the city of Minneapolis. These introductory
facts beg answers for larger questions however. How did the city put forward its plan to build
the HHW facility, and why did it choose Northeast Minneapolis as the site of the facility? Why
did it want a facility to dispose of HHW at all, for that matter? Why did residents oppose the
facility, and how is this opposition justifiable or not justifiable? How does this ‘victory’ of use
value over exchange value contribute to understanding larger processes at work around the
country and the world today?

1

Referred to hereafter as ‘the HHW facility’ or ‘the facility’.
The concepts of use versus exchange value of land will be defined and discussed later, in the literature and theory
section of this paper.
2
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With these questions in mind, I argue the thesis that the city of Minneapolis, as a nonresident actor, put forward the plan for the HHW facility in the interest of furthering value-free
growth to increase the city’s return on exchange value through taxes. Furthermore, I argue that
residents’ objections to the facility were justifiable because their tie to the use value of the land
would be at risk if the city built the facility. Expanding on this thesis requires the background
documentation of the case, an examination of relevant theory, and a critical analysis of the case
in relation to theory.
Consequently, this paper is organized into four sections. The first section puts forward
the data collected for this paper and the methods used to analyze the case. The second section
reviews the relevant literature on the theories of the political economy of place, NIMBYism and
environmental justice, to establish a framework for understanding the specifics of this case.
The third section analyzes the data of the case through the lens of theory, proving the thesis
above. The fourth section concludes the paper with an assessment of the significance of this
research bears on understanding the political economy of place perspective.
Data and Methods – Putting Together the Case:

In putting together this case study, I have relied on documents from the city of
Minneapolis, primarily from the Transportation and Public Works Committee, which is
responsible for overseeing infrastructural projects in the city such as the HHW facility plan. In
addition to those city documents, I have relied on my previous research into industrialization in
Northeast Minneapolis which was conducted in the fall of 2009 for the Windom Park Citizens in
Action (WPCIA) organization. The WPCIA were the primary actors in agitating against the
HHW facility, and I have also drawn upon their meeting minutes that have dealt with the HHW
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facility. Tying these sources together creates a narrative for describing the steps taken by the
city and residents in relation to the plan.
The case of the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis came to be in January 2004,
when the city of Minneapolis put forward a plan to build a household hazardous waste facility in
the city. The reason behind this decision was, the city argued, that participation in HHW
management is inversely correlated to the distance traveled to dispose of HHW, and since
Minneapolis residents have a lower rate of automobile ownership than residents in surrounding
suburbs, an HHW facility in the city would encourage greater participation. (City of
Minneapolis, 2004a) Prior to this, residents were able to dispose of HHW at a transfer station in
South Minneapolis off of Hiawatha Avenue, which was then taken to one of the two HHW
facilities to the north and south of the city, operated by Hennepin County. (City of Minneapolis,
2004b) Map 5 illustrates the distribution of participation in HHW management across Hennepin
County. It shows that indeed Minneapolis has a low percentage of people participating in HHW
management, while residents who live in areas closest to the HHW facilities north and south of
the city participate in greater numbers according to proximity.

10
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Map 5 – Distribution of participation in HHW management across Hennepin County (credit: City of Minneapolis)
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In 2006, the city sold this transfer station in South Minneapolis to the Green Institute for
use as a biomass heat and power station. At the same time, it began investigating possible sites
for constructing a new HHW facility. (City of Minneapolis, 2004c; ibid. 2006d) The first site
under consideration was a property in the SEMI district of Northeast Minneapolis off Malcolm
Avenue. This Malcolm Ave site was negotiated for and purchased by the city, and is currently in
operation as a waste disposal facility; though not currently accepting HHW disposal, this facility
is slated to accept HHW in the future.3 (City of Minneapolis, 2006e) Having already purchased
one site, the city then proceeded to examine possible sites for a second facility. The site chosen
was off of Industrial Boulevard in Northeast Minneapolis, in the Mid-City Industrial District.
(City of Minneapolis, 2008b) This is the site in question for this case study. The site was
formerly owned by Macy’s, and then by a bottling company, but the current property owner
leaves the site vacant. The decision to site the facility here came because the facility is limited to
an I-3 zone, or a general industry zone. Northeast Minneapolis has the highest abundance of I-3
zones in the city, but by no means are they exclusive to this area. Beyond this, the facility is part
of a larger industrial redevelopment plan which is centered on revitalizing industry in Northeast
Minneapolis while changing industrial land uses elsewhere to mixed commercial and residential
developments. (City of Minneapolis, 2006a; Truax, 2009) This answers the first research
question of this paper, of how the plan came to be put in place.
Upon learning about the proposed plan, residents in the Windom Park neighborhood of
Northeast Minneapolis began to investigate the nature of the facility. Neighborhood group
meeting minutes reveal residents’ reactions towards the facility, citing as opposition an overabundance of industry already present in Northeast Minneapolis, as well as concerns that the

3

Because the facility at Malcolm Ave is not accepting HHW at this time, it does not factor in significantly to this
case, other than as background information.
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facility would lead to increased traffic, among other impacts. (WPCIA, 2009) Among these
other impacts was a growing unease among residents about the risk posed by the concentration
of industrial properties in Northeast Minneapolis and the negative environmental impact they
caused. (Truax, 2009) In reaction to these concerns and in the spirit of residents’ concerns, the
property owner of the Industrial Blvd site declined to sell the property to the city. As a
consequence, the plan for the HHW facility was mothballed. This research is limited in its scope
since exact causes of why the property owner did not sell to the city could not be investigated.
How did this happen? The path this case has followed is simple to describe. The city
wanted to increase collection of household hazardous waste by siting a facility in Northeast
Minneapolis where it would be easy to access by residents without cars. The residents there
objected because the facility was further unwanted industrial development which put them at risk.
In turn, the property owner decided not to sell to the city, and the plan was ended. Why did this
happen though? This is not a simple question to answer. To do so, the case must be understood
through a framework of theory which elaborates on how different actors prioritize the value of
their land, and mitigate the risks to those values.
Literature and Theory – Building Up the Case

The thesis of this paper argues that the city put forward the plan for the HHW facility to
increase its tax revenues through value-free growth, but that residents’ objections were justifiable
because Northeast Minneapolis residents’ ties to their use value would at risk from the facility.
What is the growth machine, and what is use value versus exchange value? To unpack these
contentions, it is necessary to understand the foundational theory contributing to this case, the
perspective of political economy of place.

13
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Political economy of place: land, its values, and those who value it
The political economy of place perspective puts forward that land is a unique commodity;
the uniqueness of which is described in two values. The first value is that land carries with it
particular attachments by the people who use that land, known as the use value. These
attachments range from the emotional – land as ‘home’ – to the practical – land as a place to live
and exist. Because of these attachments, the use value of land is not easily transferrable to a
dissimilar location, and consequently the use value of land is highly sensitive to change in the
area surrounding it. Use value of land may increase or diminish as a result of changes to that
land – adding a garage to a house or having the roof collapse, for instance. However, use value
is also affected by outside changes. An increase in local crime, a decrease in air quality, or the
construction of a new school in the area will all affect the use value of land profoundly as the
emotional and practical attachments to that land change according to the situation. The second
form of land’s uniqueness is that land is a commodity, and like all commodities it can be bought
and sold at a price. This is the exchange value of land. (Logan & Molotch, 1987)
While all land possesses use and exchange values in some way, the actors concerned with
that land prioritize which value is most important to them differently. Residents, defined for this
case as homeowners4, prioritize the use value of land more than the exchange value because
residents typically buy land to live on it5. A resident’s land is their livelihood – part of the wider
‘triple dream’ of home, land and community. The derivation of this livelihood comes through a
transformation of land from a natural state through day to day actions into a place that supports
the life of the resident. (Hayden, 2004; Pred, 1984) Their investment in land is typically

4

Renters are residents who have different characteristics associated with their use of land, but they are excluded
from the discussion of this theory because renters are not a significant group of actors in this case study.
5
At least during periods of residency when they are not concerned with buying or selling land.
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substantial, as most of a resident’s assets are fixed to the land they own. This investment is also
immobile, since most residents are not multiple-property owners and only live in one place at
one time. Because of the high substantiality and immobility of the investment residents make
into land, and because they derive their livelihood by living on their land, their investment has
high risk6. Use value, represented as a portion of their total investment in land, is therefore
sensitive and at risk to change. (Fischel, 2001; Logan & Molotch, 1987)
Non-resident actors, including corporations, utilities, and governments – and who are
also known as rentiers -, prioritize the exchange value of land. This is because for them land is
not being bought to be lived on, and as such the emotional and practical attachments to land are
minimal. What matters for actors concerned with exchange value is just that: the value of the
land in monetary terms. Additionally, since non-resident actors are primarily not concerned with
use value, changes in use value – from crime, pollution or the like – tend to be negligible risks
for their investment. The non-resident actors who, operating at a larger geographic scale,
possess the most influence are those with substantial capital and a diversity of land ownership.
Consider a development firm or a city government, for example, which possess large sums of
capital and large amounts of land. As a result of possessing substantial capital and diverse land
holdings, the investment of non-resident actors into any one piece of land is usually insubstantial
compared to the whole of their wealth. Furthermore, because they possess multiple pieces of
land, they can move a desired land use from place to place with relative ease. This low
substantiality and high mobility means that the investment risk of any one piece of land is low.
Risk does exist however, and the specifics of this risk are detailed later on. (Fischel, 2001;

6

Risk is defined here as the likelihood that the value – use or exchange – of land will decrease while in the
ownership of the purchasing agent and that this decrease will have a substantial impact on the recoupment of the
initial investment (Fischel, 2001)
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Logan & Molotch, 1987) Table 1 broadly illustrates the characteristics of these two actors and
their relationship with land.

Table 1 – Characteristics of actors’ relationship with land

Actor
Residents
NonResidents

Mobility of
investment

Substantiality
of investment

Concern with
use value

Low

High

High

Concern with
exchange
value
Low

High

Low

Low

High

Risk to
investment
High
Low

So far the political economy of place perspective establishes definitions of use value and
exchange value, their importance to different actors, and the relative risk associated with land
investment for both types of actors. The next theoretical piece that is necessary to understand is
the concept of the growth machine.
Capitalism is predicated under the Schumpeterian principal of creative destruction. New
growth is based on the destruction of what came before. Because new growth brings wealth to
those who have invested in that growth, the system perpetuates itself for as long as the investors
benefit from growth. In short, this is the growth machine. A fundamental component of the
growth machine is the concept of value-free growth, where growth in any form is perceived as a
public good. Growth machines tend to be put into place and operated by local elites –
corporations, utilities and governments, for instance – for their own benefit, but in the process
bring benefits to the surrounding community, through jobs, infrastructural improvement, and the
like. Over the course of time, the concept of the growth machine has become engrained into the
structures of public life as a legitimate means of using space. (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Pred,
1984) Because this is normally how growth machines are perceived by the public – as being a
hegemonic public good – they continue to perpetuate. Normally. There are important
exceptions though where the hegemony of value free growth is challenged, and the case of the
16
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HHW facility is one such exception. To understand how it is an exception though, the theory of
NIMBYism must be introduced into this discussion of theory.
NIMBYism: minimizing risk to use value
NIMBYism, which means ‘not in my back yard’, is the concept of group opposition to a
given development in a local area, usually due to the development’s perceived negative
externalities. NIMBYism was first coined in the 1980s, and has since entered into both the
academic and mainstream vocabulary, usually as a pejorative associated with intolerant, shortsighted and obstructionist opposition by residents. (McClymont & O’Hare, 2008) These
criticisms arise when NIMBYs oppose seemingly innocuous or even beneficial development.
However, NIMYBism is a rational and defensible principle when understood in the context of
what is at stake for NIMBYs. NIMBYs are almost exclusively residents, though NIMBYs may
coordinate with non-resident actors to further their opposition. Because NIMBYs are residents,
and because residents have high investment risk associated with their land, residents want to
keep that risk to a minimum. (Fischel, 2001) How then is risk minimized? To answer this, it is
necessary to interpret NIMBYism in the context of the political economy of place perspective.
Residents invest in their land under a certain set of assumptions. Namely, that their
investment is not going to excessively depreciate over time. Residents can directly control how
their land depreciates in use value by making improvements to and maintaining their land7. This
preserves their livelihood within the parameters of their land itself. However, changes to the
surrounding area are not directly controllable by residents, and consequently any depreciation in
use value, in this context, is outside their control. Therefore, residents want stability more than
they want change, because change can negatively affect use value, and consequently affect their
7

Residents rarely seek to depreciate the use value of their land. Consequently, it can be assumed that any action
taken on their part would be towards minimizing or countering depreciation of use value.
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livelihood. It is true that not all change is bad, but residents are not concerned with whether
change is good or bad. To residents, the risk to their livelihood presented by possible negative
change always outweighs the risk to their livelihood presented by no change at all. Use value
reflects not just what is happening on the land now, but the odds of what will happen in the
future as well. Therefore, even the perception of risk can bring about depreciation in use value.
(Fischel, 1990; Fischel, 2001) Table 2 illustrates the different ways in which residents
experience risk to the use value of their land, and subsequently, to their livelihood.

Table 2 – Residents’ control over change in land use and risk posed to use value by change

Residents’ Control
Risk to use value

Direct Change
High
Low

Indirect Change
Low
High

Stability (No Change)
Dependent
Low

A resident’s control over the stability of their land depends on how vigilant they are
about opposing development. The most successful residents are those who are well-connected
with one another in organizing opposition, who are well-informed of the details of any proposed
change in land use around their land, and who are frequently present and vocal in their
opposition. (Heiman, 1990) Among the most successful NIMBY campaigns ever was the work
of Jane Jacobs and others in New York City during the 1960s to combat the many public works
projects of Robert Moses and other city planners. These efforts, from stopping the renovation of
Washington Square Park to stopping the construction of the Lower Manhattan Expressway,
involved a large network of New York residents in various capacities – lawyers, printers,
mothers, journalists – all collaborating with one another to publicize the perceived damaged that
these city plans would have on the livelihoods of residents. The triumph of NIMBYism in this
case was a watershed moment in changing public perception of the growth machine from it being

18
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an inevitable force for the greater good to being a thing that is not universally benign and can be
opposed. (Alexiou, 2006)
NIMBYism centers on minimizing risk to use value and livelihood for residents. As
mentioned earlier, risk also exists for non-resident actors, though in a different sense. Nonresident actors tend not to be NIMBYs, since they do not prioritize use value as highly as they
prioritize exchange value. Also, the diffuse, mobile investment of non-resident actors translates
into lower risk. Exchange value benefits non-resident actors most when, at the time of
disinvestment, it has increased from the initial investment. This increase depends on growth, i.e.
something happening on the land to make it more valuable. It is therefore in the best interest of
non-resident actors to do something to the land they have invested in to increase exchange value,
even if this in turn decreases use value for surrounding residents. Stability of exchange value is
antithetical for non-resident actors, since they derive nothing from not growing their investment.
The higher the exchange value, the better off the non-resident actor who invested in the land
initially is. For a non-resident actor, their risk is land not gaining exchange value from initial
investment to disinvestment. (Fischel, 2001; Logan & Molotch, 1987)
To reiterate, residents seek to minimize the risk that first, their land will depreciate in use
value, and second, that their livelihoods will be negatively impacted as a consequence. Nonresident actors must put forward growth to increase the exchange value of the land they have
invested in so they gain more at the time of disinvestment. Not doing so would mean risking a
loss of investment. For residents though, this growth represents a risk that the use value of their
land might depreciate. In response to this possible depreciation and loss of livelihood, they
oppose growth through NIMBYism. NIMBYism manifests itself when residents understand
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what growth will occur that will impact their use value and organizing themselves to oppose that
growth. (Fischel, 2001; Heiman, 1990; Logan & Molotch, 1987)
NIMBYism - understood here through the terms established from the political economy
of place perspective - provides a broad understanding of why non-resident actors favor growth
and why residents oppose growth. However, the specifics of the case of HHW facility are more
nuanced than NIMBYism alone can explain. The HHW facility and industrial land use in
general carry a negative connotation in people’s minds as a land use, and rightly so since these
land uses disproportionately depreciate residents’ use values in relation to other forms of growth,
like other residential land use or commercial land use. Understanding how and why industrial
growth is particular in this way requires an investigation of environmental justice.

Environmental Justice: industry, depreciation of value, and stopping both

Environmental justice is defined for this case as the principle that all people and
communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and public health laws and
regulation. (Bullard, 1996) What, though, are these laws protecting against? The short answer
is environmental degradation. The long answer is that environmental justice protects against and
fights the abuse by industries of the environment and the depreciation of livelihoods of residents
proximate to those industries. Before that is discussed though, a definition of industrial land use
is required.
Industrial land use has many definitions. In the planning context of the city of
Minneapolis, industry is divided into three land use categories: I-1, light industry; I-2, medium
industry; and I-3, general industry. (City of Minneapolis, 2006a) These descriptors by
themselves define almost nothing, other than that each category is successively more intensive in

20
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cities/vol2/iss1/9

20

Truax: Triumph against the machine

its land use. Definitions from other sources provide more information. Light industry tends to
be consumer-oriented and has a small environmental impact. (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2007)
General industry, otherwise known as heavy industry, lacks a specific definition, but this case
study uses the definition that general industry is the opposite of light industry. General industry
tends to produce goods for or to service other industries, and have the greatest impact on the
environment of any industrial land use. The characteristics of medium industry fall in between
those of light and general industry. Because the HHW facility is zoned I-3, or general industry,
it can be inferred that it has a high environmental impact relative to light and medium industrial
land uses. Bearing this high impact in mind, it is now time to delve into the details of
environmental justice.
Environmental justice calls for the elimination of environmental disparities and hazards
that disproportionately impact communities. Studies show that hazardous waste facilities, like
the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis, tend to be sited in areas with communities already
experiencing risk to their livelihoods, and that these communities as a consequence shoulder a
disproportionate amount of the burden on the environment relative to other surrounding
communities. (Boone et al., 2009; Bullard, 1996; Coburn, 2003; Lejano & Iseki, 2001) The
process of how and the reason why residents desire environmental justice where they live can be
understood through the political economy of place.
It has been established that non-resident actors wish to minimize the risk to their
investment in land by putting forward growth to increase the exchange value of that land.
Residents desire to minimize the risk to the use value of their land by opposing this growth. It
has also been established that the growth machine is dependent on growth being perceived as a
public good. Growth tied to industrial land use complicates the notion of growth for the public
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good however, since industrial land use can produce serious and visible damages to the
livelihood of residents and non-resident actors alike. Activism and science in recent years have
exposed the severe dangers posed to human livelihoods by pollution and environmental
degradation. (Wolch, 2007) Generally, environmental degradation leads to a collapse of vital
natural systems – the water cycle, food production, etc. Consequently, environmental
degradation is sought to be avoided. (Wheeler, 1998)
Specific to this case, land contaminated by industrial pollution - or Brownfield land - has
lower use and exchange value than uncontaminated land - or Greenfield land. Furthermore
Brownfield land lowers these values for surrounding properties. Remediation is necessary for
land to be worthwhile for residents to use or for non-residents to invest in for the purpose of
future exchange. Remediation of Brownfield land is significantly more expensive than
investment in Greenfield land, since Brownfield land must be brought back to a point of
usefulness through investment in cleanup, while Greenfield land is already at a point of
usefulness. Because of these high costs, the total percentage of all remediation efforts
undertaken is usually by non-resident actors more often than by residents. This is because they
have more assets and operate at over larger areas. (De Sousa, 2006; De Sousa et al., 2009)
Figure 1 illustrates the total cost of investing in Brownfield versus Greenfield land.
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Figure 1 – Total cost of investing in Brownfield versus Greenfield land

Industrial contamination produces Brownfield land, which requires significant investment
to be made useful again. While market logic would predict that no one would invest in
Brownfield remediation when they could reap greater benefits from investment into Greenfield
land, land is a limited resource. As such, two trends appear in the pursuit of environmental
justice. The first trend is remediation, or the cleanup of the land to a point where it has equal
usefulness to Greenfield land. The second trend, which is of most concern to this case, is
prevention of contamination. (De Sousa, 2009) Preventing contamination of land is uncertain
work. After all, how does one stop something from happening that might never occur in the first
place? Preventing land contamination therefore centers on risk management. Within the
approach of contamination prevention, there are yet another two divergent branches for
mitigating risk; the first is containment of hazards ex post facto, the second is elimination of
hazards ex ante facto.
Containment of hazards legitimates that certain hazardous substances must be produced
and disseminated in the public sphere - to either fulfill the livelihoods of residents or to
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propagate the growth machine upon which non-resident actors depend - and that these hazardous
substances must be cleaned up and disposed of after they have been used for their intended
purpose. For residents, these hazardous substances include paint, plumbing chemicals, lawn
fertilizers, and the like – in short, they constitute household hazardous waste. For non-resident
actors, hazardous substances can range from petroleum naphtha used for heating to heavy metals
used in high-tech scientific research. Containment of hazardous substances requires the
construction and operation of facilities designed to handle the waste in a controlled manner. The
HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis is an example of such a facility. (Isaacs, 2001; Truax,
2009)
Elimination of hazards, on the contrary, does not legitimate that certain hazardous
substances must be produced and disseminated. This approach can be summed up in the
acronym NIABY, or ‘not in anyone’s back yard’. Rather than uncritically accepting that
hazardous substances are needed to fulfill livelihoods or propagate growth, NIABYism calls for
the rethinking and reshaping of production and use of substances so that they are not a hazard to
the public sphere in the first place. (Heiman, 1990; Watson & Bulkeley, 2005)
Both approaches have benefits and costs, of course. The benefit of containment is that it
allows for the use of hazardous substances that are considered necessary for livelihood or for
growth, provided that after they have fulfilled their usefulness, these substances will be cleaned
up and disposed of properly. However, the cost is that this provision is not always followed
through to completion, and hazardous substances end up contaminating the environment at the
cost of both use and exchange value. Northeast Minneapolis alone contains more than 300
industrial producers of hazardous waste and over 100 sites of industrial contamination, a high
proportion relative to the rest of the city. (Truax, 2009) In order for containment to be
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successful, facilities must be built to dispose of hazardous waste, and more importantly
hazardous waste must be safely and reliably brought to these disposal sites for removal. (City of
Minneapolis, 2004a; Isaacs, 2001) The benefit of elimination, through NIABYism, is that it
keeps hazardous substances from being a risk in the first place by delegitimizing their use for
livelihoods or for growth. The cost, though, is that this requires the producers of hazardous
substances to not produce them in the first place, and for the consumers of hazardous products to
not consume them. In short, it requires residents and non-resident actors to make do with nonhazardous substances to fulfill their livelihood or propagate growth. (Heiman, 1990) The next
component that is necessary to understand is who prefers which method of contamination
prevention and why.
Generally speaking, non-resident actors tend to favor containment. They benefit from the
growth associated with the production of hazardous substances, the value of their dissemination
through sale, and the exchange value tied up in constructing facilities for the disposal of
hazardous waste. Residents, particularly NIMBYs and NIABYs, tend to favor elimination.
They benefit from the complete removal of risk to the use value of their land associated with
hazardous substances, whereas under containment risk is only removed when containment is
successfully carried out. It is important to stress that non-resident actors benefit from both
approaches to risk prevention, since the risk of Brownfield contamination, and consequently the
risk to exchange value, is mitigated when either approach is successfully carried out. However,
the risk is more substantial under a policy of containment, since containment is not always
successful and Brownfield contamination may still occur. True, elimination is not always
successful as well, but all things being equal, risk is less through elimination than through
containment.
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At this point, the theory of this case has established seven contentions. First, residents
prioritize use value because land is their livelihood, while non-resident actors prioritize exchange
value because land is their means of acquiring wealth. Second, non-resident actors perpetuate
the hegemony of value-free growth, because through growth land increases in exchange value
from the point of initial investment to the point of disinvestment. Third, there are exceptions to
this hegemony; principally the NIMBY concept, which centers on opposing growth to minimize
the potential risk that the use value of a resident’s land might depreciate as a result of growth.
Fourth, risk also exists for non-resident actors in the form of not increasing exchange value
above the point of initial investment, and therefore non-resident actors put forward growth as a
means of ensuring an increased return on their investment into land. Fifth, growth in industrial
land use – particularly heavy or general industry - bears disproportionate risk in relation to other
forms of growth because contamination from industry decreases use and exchange value and is
costly to remediate. Sixth, environmental justice seeks to protect those at risk from
environmental degradation by preventing contamination of land, principally by industry.
Seventh, environmental justice fulfills this protective role in two ways; the first, favored by nonresident actors, is the containment of hazardous substances after they have been disseminated
into the public sphere, and the second, favored by residents, is the elimination of hazardous
substances before they enter the public sphere. Having made these contentions, it is time to
reexamine the thesis of this paper.
I argue that the city of Minneapolis put forward the HHW facility to further value-free
growth and increase its return on exchange values through taxation, and that residents’ objections
were justifiable because their tie to use value puts them at risk were the HHW facility to be built.
It is evident at this point - albeit only in general terms - that residents prioritize use value because
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they derive their livelihood from their land. Their land is a substantial, immobile investment that
is subject to high risk, and the preservation of that use value is of utmost importance, lest their
livelihood be negatively affected. What is not evident is how the city of Minneapolis benefits
from exchange values. To understand this, and to refine the understanding of residents’
prioritization of use values to specific terms, it is necessary to understand the political economy
of place perspective as it relates to scale and spaces of dependence and engagement.

Scale: where actors act, how actors act, why actors act

How does the city of Minneapolis, or any city for that matter, benefit from exchange
values? Taxes! Cities are essentially whole-scale rentiers, who piggyback upon the gains of
other, smaller non-resident actors. By taxing residents and non-resident actors for the use and
exchange of land, cities receive a percentage of all investments and disinvestments within their
jurisdiction, and consequently become beneficiaries of the growth machine. Cities are allowed
to do this because they have a monopoly on power within their jurisdiction which is legitimated
through the spending their tax revenues by providing. (Cox, 1998; Hegel, 1991; Logan &
Molotch, 1987; Pred, 1984) Implicit in this power dynamic between the city and those it taxes
are the issues of spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. A space of dependence is
defined simply as the space in which material wellbeing –livelihood - is realized. For residents
and non-resident actors alike, these spaces of dependence are tied to their land. A space of
engagement is defined simply as the space where actions transpire protecting the systems that
allow spaces of dependence to operate. (Cox, 1998)
For residents - viewed within the context of the political economy of place - a space of
engagement ranges from their land where they exert direct control over the depreciation of use
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values all the way to the global level where they exert indirect control over the depreciation of
use values. For this case study, however, the relevant spaces of engagement extend only to the
city-wide level. Similar scales exist for the spaces of engagement utilized by non-resident actors.
Again for this case study, the relevant spaces of engagement for the non-resident actor in
question – the city of Minneapolis – extend to the city-wide level.
Though land is the space of dependence for both residents and non-resident actors, the
scale of this dependence differs significantly. As mentioned earlier, a resident typically does not
possess more than one piece of land upon which to derive their livelihood. However, because
residents prioritize use value, and because use value is sensitive to outside changes, their space
of dependence must be larger than the land itself. The realization of their material wellbeing is
dependent on surrounding spaces not being a source of use value change; commonly,
depreciation. Protecting use value from direct change can only be exercised at a scale limited to
the land itself, and so the space of engagement matches this scale. Protecting use value from
indirect change requires ensuring the space of engagement is at a scale that matches the extent to
which surrounding spaces risk affecting the use value of their land. Consequently, ensuring no
change in surrounding spaces requires engaging those surrounding spaces and mitigating the risk
they pose to the use value of the land in question. Table 3 illustrates the extent to which spaces
of dependence and engagement for residents must extend in order to affect direct, indirect and no
change.

Table 3 – Necessary extent of spaces of dependence and engagement to affect direct, indirect and no change

Direct Change
Space of Dependence
Space of Engagement

Indirect Change

Land itself

Stability (No Change)

Surrounding Spaces (Risks)
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The methods residents use for mitigating risk are variable from context to context. Those
that concern this case are the methods outlined under NIMBYism and environmental justice.
They include neighborhood education of risks presented by growth and organizing to oppose that
growth. In the context of industrial growth, residents organize in opposition of land
contamination from hazardous waste and argue for the elimination of hazardous substances from
the public sphere.
For non-resident actors like the city of Minneapolis, the space of dependence is their
taxation jurisdiction, or all the land within the city. A city, after all, is a non-resident actor which
is concerned with exchange value more than use value. Its investment into land does not
manifest itself specifically through the purchase and sale of land to recoup exchange value, but
rather manifests itself primarily through taxation8. As a result, the space of engagement for the
city encompasses all this land, and the purpose of this engagement is to ensure that taxes will
continue to come into the city coffers. The structures that allow a city to maintain its monopoly
on power are based on the assumption that the city uses the benefits of its power – taxes – to
minimize the risk to exchange values of the land in their jurisdiction. In this way, the city
perpetuates the growth machine by using the methods at its disposal to ensure that the nonresident actors within its jurisdiction experience the highest return on their proper investments
into land. Consequently, these non-resident actors pay taxes at an optimal level9. The methods
in question for ensuring optimal taxes are diverse, but those that are of most concern for this case
study are the methods by which the city mitigates Brownfield contamination – principally
through waste management. (Cox, 1998; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Pred, 1984)

8

Cities do purchase and sell land, but a city never owns a majority of the land in its jurisdiction.
Optimal level is the state where non-resident actors receive an uninhibited return on investment in land. Nonoptimal level is the state where the return on investment is inhibited, say by Brownfield contamination.
9
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Additionally, this circle of taxation and service provision benefits residents as well, who
experience a minimization of risk to use value because the city – operating at a larger scale space
of engagement than they – mitigates those risks through service provision. In return, residents
fulfill their livelihoods and pay taxes at an optimal level. The city is not majorly concerned with
protecting use value though. This is because the city only stands to lose tax revenue when use
value is at risk, and cannot gain more than a maximum amount when use value is not at risk.
Figure 2 illustrates the difference in theoretical tax revenue in relation to risk for non-resident
actors and residents.

Figure 2 – Tax potential of different actors in relation to risk

Because the city stands to gain more in taxes from ensuring non-resident actors experience less
risk than from ensuring the same for residents, the city concentrates its efforts accordingly.
However, because the actions of the city are not monolithic, i.e. they do not benefit only one
group of actors over another, residents perpetuate the power monopoly of the city since they too
benefit from the perpetuation of the growth machine. Without the city providing services from
30
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taxation, exchange value and use value would be at risk. Therefore, risk mitigation would be up
to individual residents and non-resident actors who typically operate at scales too small to
effectively do that. (Logan & Molotch, 1987) Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the
city, residents and non-resident actors in terms of risk mitigation, service provision and taxation.

Figure 3 – Relationship between city, residents and non-resident actors

Before moving on, in addition to the seven contentions outlined earlier, the issue of scale
presents two new contentions. The eighth contention is that, since use value is sensitive to
indirect change from outside, the spaces of dependence and engagement of residents must extend
to include surrounding spaces in order to mitigate that risk. The ninth contention is that cities, as
non-resident actors possessing a monopoly on power in their jurisdiction (read: space of
dependence), act to propagate the growth machine to increase their tax revenues and in turn
legitimate their power over their jurisdiction (read: space of engagement).
This entire relationship between the city, residents and non-resident actors assumes that
the propagation of the growth machine in turn mitigates risk successfully and universally.
Astride this assumption sits the principal criticism that this case study presents against value-free
growth – that the actions a city takes to mitigate risk may actually create risk. Understanding
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this criticism requires that the nine contentions outlined in this paper be applied to the case. Now
it is time to examine how and why the growth machine of the city of Minneapolis was stopped
from building a household hazardous waste facility by some of the very residents it thought
would benefit from the facility.
Analysis – Understanding the Case

Having rigorously illuminated the theoretical framework necessary to understand the case,
now it is time to do just that. The second research question of this paper asks why the city
wanted an HHW facility at all. Drawing upon the political economy of place perspective, the
city of Minneapolis wanted an HHW facility to mitigate the risk that household hazardous waste
would depreciate the value of land from which the city draws its taxes. The city of Minneapolis,
as a non-resident actor, prioritizes exchange value. Growth increases exchange values from
initial investment to the point of disinvestment, and the city of Minneapolis capitalizes on this
growth through taxation. The city of Minneapolis, after all, derives its livelihood not from living
on land but from taxing the land in its jurisdiction. Mitigating risk to use value benefits the
city’s tax revenue only so far as use value is preserved at the point of optimal efficiency for
taxation. On the other hand, mitigating risk to exchange value benefits the city’s tax revenue
from the point of optimal efficiency and above. Mitigating risk to exchange value, therefore,
becomes the most lucrative means by which the city can increase its tax revenue and perpetuate
its monopoly on power.
Household hazardous waste, when exposed to the environment, becomes a contaminant
and valuable Greenfield land depreciates in use and exchange value to Brownfield land. As a
consequence, the city garnishes fewer taxes from this contaminated land, and costly remediation
must be undertaken for the land to return to usefulness. Because participation in HHW
32
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cities/vol2/iss1/9

32

Truax: Triumph against the machine

management is low in Minneapolis, the result of residents not having access to the facilities
which exist in Brooklyn Park and Bloomington, HHW in Minneapolis represents a controllable –
though currently uncontrolled – risk. In other words, there is room for improvement. The HHW
facility in Northeast Minneapolis would provide a geographically proximate place for residents
to dispose of HHW, and in turn mitigate the risk of value depreciation through contamination.
The risk of value depreciation would be unacceptable to the city, since the loss of revenue from
taxes means that it cannot provide as many services to residents and non-resident actors within
their jurisdiction. This would delegitimize their monopoly on power. No one wants the city of
Minneapolis to lose its monopoly on power, because the city is uniquely positioned with a space
of engagement which can mitigate risks too large for individual actors to tackle. In this vein, the
HHW facility plan mitigates risks to value – both exchange and use – for all actors in the city
and should be perceived as a public good under normal circumstances.
Once again though, this paper focuses on the abnormal. The third research question of
this paper asks why residents objected to the HHW facility. Under normal circumstances,
greater access to participation in HHW management would benefit residents. Not only would
the city draw more taxes and be able to provide more services - increasing the use value of
residents’ land - the risk posed to use value by HHW contamination would be mitigated as well.
This argumentation assumes two things. First, that the HHW facility would successfully provide
greater access for participation in HHW management; second, that the HHW facility itself would
not impact use value in the area surrounding it. These assumptions are both false.
Key to the city’s logic of increasing participation in HHW management is that a
geographically proximate HHW facility would be accessible by residents without automobiles.
The HHW facility is sited in between Industrial Boulevard and Highway 280 in Northeast
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Minneapolis. Access to this site by public transportation is minimal, since it lies away from bus
and light rail lines. Additionally, the site is not easily accessible by foot. These facts are
insubstantial though since household hazardous waste is not easily transferable by any
transportation mode other than private automobile or municipal waste vehicles. For example, it
is hard to conceive of anyone bringing old five-gallon paint cans or empty bottles of plumbing
chemicals on a city bus, and then carrying those things from the bus stop to the HHW facility
itself. To wit, the problem with increasing participation in HHW management cannot be solved
by building a geographically proximate facility. Access to this facility is still impeded by a
fundamental lack of transportation. This analysis invalidates the concept that the planned HHW
facility would mitigate risk citywide by removing the threat of contamination from HHW from
the environment. Of course, the objections of residents are not justifiable based on this point
alone. Just because the facility would not be fully accessible is no reason to oppose it – ‘do not
let the perfect stand in the way of the good’ one might say. Justifying residents’ objections to the
HHW facility requires examining the scale of the impact of the facility as a structure.
The second assumption is the more serious one that the city makes in this case.
Contrary to being a benign form of growth, the HHW facility negatively affects the use value of
the land surrounding it in three ways. First, use value is more sensitive to change than exchange
value, and the HHW facility represents a change and consequently a risk to use value. Second,
the HHW facility is an industrial property, and as such represents an increase in the percentage
of industrial properties already present in over-industrialized Northeast Minneapolis, which
negatively impacts use value. Third, the HHW facility encourages the dissemination of
household hazardous waste into the public sphere rather than eliminating waste out right. As
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HHW is allowed to disseminate, it presents a risk to use value, which in turn negatively impacts
use value.
Residents in Northeast Minneapolis, like residents anywhere, invested in the land they
own under a set of existing conditions. These conditions basically equal that the land would not
excessively depreciate over time. They control the depreciation over their land in a direct way,
but indirectly controlling change requires operating at a space of engagement that is larger than
the land of any one resident, and requires the space of engagement to encompass all possible
risks. The HHW facility is a risk, since it represents change, and change always carries with it a
risk of negative impact. The residents of Northeast Minneapolis want stability in the land
surrounding them, so that change cannot negatively impact their use value and in turn their
livelihoods. For the reason that the HHW facility represents a change in the land surrounding
them, the residents’ opposition to the facility is justified.
Furthermore, the HHW facility is an industrial property and industrial properties carry the
risk of contaminating the surrounding land. Despite the fact that the HHW is a means of
containing hazardous waste, it also represents a concentration of hazardous waste whose
accidental release into the public sphere would be significantly more detrimental to use value in
the surrounding area. This concentrated contamination poses a high risk for Northeast
Minneapolis residents. Because Northeast Minneapolis residents derive their livelihoods at a
small scale – their individual pieces of land – concentrated contamination would affect them
seriously and entirely. For the city, whose livelihood is diffused across the entire jurisdiction of
the city, a concentrated contamination in Northeast Minneapolis would only partially affect the
city. Northeast Minneapolis therefore bears the burden of all the risk from HHW in the city
being concentrated in their back yard, as it were. Though the HHW facility would have
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safeguards, the only sure prevention of accidental contamination is that there be no contaminants
around in the first place. Neighborhood residents were aware of the risks posed by an accidental
concentrated contamination when they objected to the facility. It was one of the key points of
contention outlined in their meetings with the city. (WPCIA, 2009) Northeast Minneapolis
residents’ objections are founded in NIMBYism, since they argue against the negative impact
posed to their use value and livelihoods by the HHW facility. Further evidence of NIMBYism
comes from Northeast Minneapolis residents highlighting the HHW facility as further unwanted
industrialization, and in response, organizing to gather information on how to best prevent
further industrialization. My own work previously was a result of this NIMBYist organizing for
information. (Truax, 2009) Because of this risk of contamination, the objections of Northeast
Minneapolis residents are further justified.
Finally, the very existence of the HHW facility represents a regressive step in ensuring
that hazardous waste is removed from the public sphere altogether. The objections of Northeast
Minneapolis residents’ follow in the vein of environmental justice by seeking the elimination of
hazardous substances rather than simply containing them after they have been produced and
disseminated. Even if the facility were built, and even if it were successful, it would still leave
HHW in the public sphere – a potential risk to use value and livelihoods across the city. By
objecting to the HHW facility, Northeast Minneapolis residents promote the cause of ensuring
environmental justice by removing hazardous substances from the entire public sphere, not just
those who participate in the city’s HHW management efforts. This would mitigate the risk to
use value across the city in such a way that HHW would never again present a risk to use value.
Constructing the HHW facility would only invite the specter of risk that use values would one
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day be negatively impacted by household hazardous waste contamination. For this reason, the
objections of residents are justified.
Returning at last to the thesis of this paper, I have argued that the city of Minneapolis put
forward the plan for the HHW facility in Northeast Minneapolis to increase its return on
exchange value through the collection of more taxes. The HHW facility would do this by
mitigating the risk to exchange value posed by possible contamination from household hazardous
waste which would reduce the exchange value of land. I have also argued that the objections of
Northeast Minneapolis residents against the facility are justified. This is because their tie to use
value is at risk because of the HHW facility plan. The city of Minneapolis is a non-resident actor,
and like all non-resident actors it experiences risk to its investments in the land. This risk,
however, is diffuse and small because the risk to any one piece of land is, for the city,
insignificant compared to the whole. By comparison, the residents of Northeast Minneapolis
experience a much more acute risk to their livelihood. To summarize, the HHW facility in
particular would negatively impact the use value of residents’ land because it represents a
potential change that could depreciate use value for Northeast Minneapolis residents.
Additionally, the facility poses a risk of unleashing contaminants in a concentrated area, again
depreciating use value for residents. Finally, the HHW facility encourages the dissemination of
possible contaminants throughout the city which would negatively impact use value for residents,
not only in Northeast Minneapolis, but throughout the city. The HHW facility therefore
represents a significant and concentrated risk to the livelihoods of residents, while only
marginally benefiting the city in mitigating an already small, diffuse risk.
The plan for the HHW facility failed on the one hand because the property owner of the
site desired by the city refused to sell. On the other hand and upon deeper examination, it is
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apparent that the reason how and why the plan failed can only be understood through the
political economy of place perspective. The plan for the HHW facility is seated in the political
economy of place perspective – a plan by a non-resident actor to increase exchange values
through value-free growth. The objections against this facility by Northeast Minneapolis
residents are seated in NIMBYism and environmental justice – objections for stability of
surrounding land use, against further risky industrialization, and against the dissemination of
hazardous substances. These objections are also seated in the political economy of place
perspective – objections against risks to the use value and livelihoods that residents derive from
their land. In the end, because the plan puts residents at risks more than it benefits them, their
objections are justified.
This is the case of the household hazardous waste facility in Northeast Minneapolis, put
forward by the city as value-free growth, and stopped by residents who objected to the risk it
would cause them. It is now time to conclude this paper, and discuss how this case can be used
in application to broader themes of theory.
Conclusion – The Case in a Larger Context

The fourth and final research question of this paper asks how the victory of use value
over exchange value examined in this case can be applied to larger processes beyond
Minneapolis. The answer comes in two parts. The first part is that it furthers the
NIMBY/environmental justice concept of arguing against value-free growth. The second part is
that it broadens – and critiques – the political economy of place perspective.
NIMBYism and environmental justice were not the products of spontaneous
demonstration, but were instead built up in the public consciousness as problem after problem
began to be systematically opposed by those whom the problems affected. These reactions
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continue to gain support today as the potentially damaging structures which support the growth
machine are viewed with increased skepticism and objection. In this sense, the individual
actions of NIMBYs and those seeking environmental justice aggregate together to form a
coherent voice questioning growth. The residents of Northeast Minneapolis, in objecting to the
HHW facility, add to that voice.
The victory of use value over exchange value in this case also impacts the way the
political economy of place perspective is conceived. This perspective puts forward value-free
growth as hegemonic, but clearly in this case value-free growth does not prevail. Stability
through no growth and the preservation of use value ends up being the dominant action.
Therefore, the emphasis placed on growth in this perspective does not hold true. There are
exceptions to the hegemony of value-free growth – important ones that need to be incorporated
into this theory of political economy of place.
This case also critiques the political economy of place perspective since it is lacking in
several descriptive measures. The theory does not take into account individual or group agency,
which was addressed here through NIMBYism and environmental justice. Actors who resist the
growth machine and the actions they take in resistance can only be described in a dichotomy in
the political economy of place perspective. The actions of actors are prescribed only along one
of two paths – either prioritizing use value or prioritizing exchange value. What of those who
prioritize both, or neither? This case demonstrates that while the political economy of place
theory is useful in analyzing the actions of different actors, it is not perfect.
To end, the case of the household hazardous waste facility in Northeast Minneapolis is a
valuable interpretation of the political economy of place perspective, not only because the theory
helps us to understand the case but because the case elaborates the theory. This case also
illustrates important critiques of the theory. The grim, winter scene in the industrial city which
began this paper is unreal, it has turned out. The failure of the city has become a boon for
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residents, secure now that their livelihoods will not be impacted by the value-free growth
represented by the facility. Their opposition has furthered the cause of anti-growth criticisms,
protected use values elsewhere, and revealed that value-free growth spurred by the growth
machine may not be inevitable after all.
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